Publication records

We analyze incidence and evolution of patent thickets. The paper provides a modeling framework showing how competition for patent portfolios, complementarity of patented technologies and hold-up affect patenting. Predictions are that technological opportunity reduces patenting in complex technologies, while increasing patenting in discrete technologies. Competition has the opposite effects. The predictions are tested using European patent data in a panel with 2,074 patenting firms in thirty technology areas over fifteen years. A new measure of technological complexity is applied. GMM estimation results confirm the predictions of our preferred model. Patent thickets are found in nine out of thirty technology areas.

© 2013 The Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics and John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Insbesondere Sozialkompetenz und personale Kompetenz zeichnen erfolgreiche Führungspersönlichkeiten aus. Dieses Buch unterstützt sowohl junge als auch erfahrene Führungskräfte in der Analyse ihrer eigenen Motive, Werte, Emotionen und Persönlichkeitseigenschaften sowie deren Wirkung auf den Führungserfolg. Zielsetzung ist es, einen authentischen Führungsstil zu entwickeln und eigene Stärken zu erkennen und auszubauen. Best-Practice Beispiele und Fragen zur Selbstreflexion unterstützen den Transfer der Inhalte in den Unternehmensalltag.

We study how an individual's exposure to external information regulates the evaluation of entrepreneurial opportunities and entrepreneurial action. Combining data from interviews, a survey, and a comprehensive web log of an online user community spanning eight years, we find that technical information shaped opportunity evaluation and that social information about user needs drove individuals to entrepreneurial action. Our empirical findings suggest that reducing demand uncertainty is a central factor regulating entrepreneurial action, an insight that received theories of entrepreneurial action have so far overlooked.

With permission of the Academy of Management

We show that a monopolist's problem of optimal advance selling strategy can be mathematically transformed into a problem of optimal bundling strategy if four conditions hold: i. consumers and the firm agree on the probability of the states occurring, ii. the firm pre-commits to the spot prices to be charged in the advance selling stage, iii. consumers are risk-neutral, and iv. consumers and the firm do not have time preferences or when they do have time preferences, they discount future at the same rate. The result allows both researchers and practitioners to apply the insights from the well-developed vast literature on bundling to advance selling problems. In particular, we show that advance selling is more profitable than spot selling when consumer valuations across the states are independent or negatively dependent or positively dependent up to a point. We furthermore illustrate the effect of advance selling on the spot prices and consumer welfare: When the firm offers advance selling discounts, it sets higher spot prices, so consumers who do not buy in advance are worse off due to the firm offering advance selling discounts. We extend our analysis to the cases of more than two states and competition only in one of the states. We also show how advance selling can be used as an entry deterrence strategy.

 

View all ESMT Working Papers in the ESMT Working Paper Series here. ESMT Working Papers are also available via SSRN, RePEc, EconStor, and the German National Library (DNB).

This article assesses the relevance of efficiencies and other justifications in recent Article 102 TFEU cases. Based on a review of all EU decisions and openings between 2009 and mid 2013 we find that procompetitive justifications still play a mediocre role in the EU Commission’s evaluations, except in IT related abuse cases. This stands in contrast to the policy goals expressed during the reform phase (2005 to 2009), the Guidance Paper and the increasing relevance of efficiency considerations in merger proceedings. We argue that this is due to a malfunctioning of the balancing test, i.e., the weighting of pro- and anticompetitive effects, as pro- and anticompetitive effects are often non-separable and non-monotone in Article 102 TFEU cases. In addition, the increasing practice of commitment decisions reduces transparency; little guidance regarding dynamic efficiencies further diminishes the relevance of business justifications in Article 102 TFEU cases. Policy options are discussed.

 

View all ESMT Working Papers in the ESMT Working Paper Series here. ESMT Working Papers are also available via SSRN, RePEc, EconStor, and the German National Library (DNB).