Publication records

This paper analyses how different types of access regulation to next generation networks affect investments and consumer welfare. The model consists of an investment stage with uncertain returns and subsequent quantity competition. The access price is a function of investment costs and the regulatory regime. A regime with fully distributed costs or a regulatory holiday induces highest investments, followed by risk-sharing and long run incremental costs regulation. Simulations indicate that risk-sharing creates most consumer welfare, followed by regimes with fully distributed costs, regulatory holiday and long run incremental costs, respectively. Risk-sharing benefits consumers as it combines relatively high ex-ante investment incentives with strong ex-post competitive intensity.

The case describes the situation of Dirk von Ameln, permitting director of Nord Stream, in his negotiation efforts to obtain the necessary national permits for the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline. In order to obtain the Danish construction permit, Dirk von Ameln has to reach an agreement with the Danish fishermen, who fear a negative impact on their trade from the construction and operation of the pipeline. The case can be used in its two-party form for introductory negotiation courses. It serves multiple objectives, among them: 1. to understand the steps in preparing negotiations (defining own interests, improving own alternatives, determining the other party's best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA), defining a win set and the objective for the negotiation); 2. to understand the difference between distributive and integrative negotiations, specifically to demonstrate the potential for joint value creation in negotiations with public authorities; 3. to understand the process of negotiation in European cross-border infrastructure projects and its implications on developing company competencies such as management of permitting and communication; and 4. to analyze different approaches to negotiations and their implication on current negotiation strategies and future negotiations and relationships.

What is the best way to design tournaments for status, in which individuals labor primarily for the esteem of their peers? What process, in other words, should organizers of status-based contests impose upon those who covet peer recognition? We propose a formal model of status-based competition that contrasts two competing alternatives. The first, following Merton, is the "Matthew Effect," according to which a tournament's architect directs slack resources to elite actors and thus widens the distribution of rewards by favoring cumulative advantage. The second is the "Mark Effect," under which a tournament's designer instead pushes slack resources to marginal actors and thus tightens the distribution of rewards. Our results suggest that although the Mark Effect is better for the social welfare of most tournaments, the Matthew Effect is preferable in two distinct contexts: in small tournaments where variation in underlying ability translates into acute advantages for the most capable contestants; and in large tournaments whose contestants face constant, rather than rising, marginal costs-a condition we relate to contestants' perception of their work as intrinsically valuable. Our contributions are twofold: We find, counter to the thrust of Merton's work, that cumulative advantage is not invariably optimal for the functioning of status contests; and we identify circumstances in which the production of superstars is likely to make contests for status better off in aggregate. Implications for future research on status and management are discussed.

© 2011 INFORMS

Der steigende Bandbreitenbedarf aufgrund datenintensiver Anwendungen, die Konvergenz verschiedenster digitaler Kommunikationstechnologien sowie die zunehmende kommerzielle Bedeutung des Internet werfen eine der wichtigsten Fragen der kommenden Jahre auf: ob und wie sich das Wirtschaftsmodell des Internet weiterentwickeln muss und welche Rolle der Regulierung in diesem Zusammenhang zukommen sollte. Die Vor- und Nachteile einer Netzneutralitätsregulierung im US-amerikanischen Kontext werden gegenwärtig in den USA - unter Teilnahme führender Wissenschaftler - intensiv debattiert. In Europa gab es zu dem in diesem Zusammenhang eingeleiteten Konsultationsverfahren der Europäischen Kommission in der zweiten Hälfte von 2010 über 300 Stellungnahmen, was das lebhafte Interesse von politischen Entscheidungsträgern und Regulatoren, Wirtschaftsvertretern und der allgemeinen Öffentlichkeit an diesem Thema unter Beweis stellt. Was jedoch fehlt, ist eine eingehende Analyse der Auswirkungen einer Netzneutralitätsregulierung auf potenzielle Internet-Geschäftsmodelle, bei der die verschiedenen Marktbedingungen in Europa, und darunter insbesondere die europäische Zugangsregulierung, berücksichtigt werden.

A pdf file of this working paper may be available at INSEAD.

The increasing demand for bandwidth due to data-intense applications, the convergence of various digital communication technologies as well as the increasing commercial importance of the Internet has given rise to one of the most important questions in the coming years: whether and how the Internet economic model needs to evolve and what role regulation should play in this process. An extensive debate in the US - including contributions by distinguished scholars - has been looking at the pros and cons of net neutrality regulation in the US context. Also in Europe, the European Commission's consultation process in the second half of 2010, which resulted in over 300 responses, shows the vivid interest of policy makers and regulators, industry, and the general public on that matter. However, what is missing is a thorough analysis of the implications of net neutrality regulation on some possible Internet business models adapted to the different market conditions in Europe, foremost European access regulation. In this context, ESMT Competition Analysis analyzes the interaction between different net neutrality regulations and Internet business models. Net neutrality regulation, if and when formally implemented in some shape or form, has the potential to reallocate resources among industry participants, affect optimal pricing strategies, and ultimately impact investment and innovation incentives. Through these effects, the regulatory framework is going to affect which business models will be at all feasible, which are going to thrive, and which will become obsolete. The report derives and analyzes some likely future business models with a view to sustainability in terms of the ability to accommodate increasing traffic volumes and social welfare implications. Based on these assessments, the regulatory implications are discussed for each business model.

The increasing demand for bandwidth due to data-intense applications, the convergence of various digital communication technologies as well as the increasing commercial importance of the Internet has given rise to one of the most important questions in the coming years: whether and how the Internet economic model needs to evolve and what role regulation should play in this process. Net neutrality regulation, if and when formally implemented in some shape or form, has the potential to reallocate resources among industry participants, affect optimal pricing strategies and ultimately impact investment and innovation incentives. Through these effects, the regulatory framework is going to affect which business models will be at all feasible, which are going to thrive, and which will become obsolete. The report derives and analyzes some likely future business models with a view to sustainability in terms of ability to accommodate increasing traffic volumes and social welfare implications. Based on these assessments the regulatory implications are discussed for each business model. The stylized business models each focus on a different aspect: the "Congestion-Based Model" stresses the possibility to tackle congestion problems through congestion-based pricing. The "Best Effort Plus" preserves the traditional best effort network but gives ISPs more leeway with innovative services. The "Quality Classes - Content Pays" stresses the observed need of different applications for various degrees of quality of service. The "Quality Classes - User Pays" model, however, puts the focus on consumer choice for higher quality levels.