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Comment on: Ambiguity aversion in models of political economy

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 169 (1): 112–115
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Volume
169
Journal Pages
112–115
ESMT Case Study

Defining the purpose for Borussia Dortmund GmbH & Co. KGaA

ESMT Case Study No. ESMT-713-0134-1
2013 Case Writing Award, Hot Topic
Urs Müller, Ulrich Linnhoff, Bernhard Pellens (2013)
Subject(s)
Ethics and social responsibility
Keyword(s)
corporate social responsibility (CSR), defining the purpose of an organization, shareholder-value maximization versus other purposes, accounting, capitalization of human resources, valuation of assets, especially of human capital, business ethics, the role of human resources in an organization, stakeholders’ interest, legitimacy of stakeholders’ interest
In its 100th year of existence in 2009, Borussia Dortmund (BVB) was the only German soccer club listed on the stock exchange. With three days to go before the annual shareholders’ meeting on November 24 of that year, the club's managing directors, Thomas Treß and Hans-Joachim Watzke, went through the year-end figures one more time. Although the situation had improved since 2005 when the club was on the brink of insolvency, the closing accounts once again showed a negative net income. After nine years as a publicly traded company, the BVB had to report its fifth loss, this time for €5.9 million, which added up to a cumulative loss of more than €145 million. After the passing of a century, many stakeholders were concerned about the way forward. What was the organization’s purpose? What was more important, finally making a profit and meeting shareholders' expectations, or playing for the fans and the club’s honor? What could the managing directors offer to their shareholders, who had seen the value of their shares drop from €11 at the IPO to less than €1 in November 2009?
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Journal Article

Patent examination at the State Intellectual Property Office in China

Research Policy 42 (2): 552–563
Johannes Liegsalz, Stefan Wagner (2013)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
patent system, patent examination, State Intellectual Property Office China, duration analysis
The number of patent applications filed at the Chinese State Intellectual Property Office SIPO grew tremendously over the last decades and the SIPO has become the world's third largest patent office by 2009. In this paper, we provide an overview of the institutional background of patent examination in China. Moreover, we empirically analyze the determinants of the grant lags applicants have to expect at the SIPO. The multivariate duration analysis is based on the population of 443,533 patent applications filed at the SIPO between 1990 and 2002. The average grant lag is 4.71 years with considerable variation across 30 different technology areas. Interestingly, we find that Chinese applicants are able to achieve faster patent grants than their non-Chinese counterparts (even after controlling for various other determinants of grant lags). This might be an indication of a differential treatment of Chinese applicants which would be in violation of Art. 3 (National Treatment) and Art. 4 (Most-favored Nation Treatment) of TRIPS that has been signed by China in 2001.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
42
Journal Pages
552–563
Journal Article

A theory of self-control and naïveté: The blights of willpower and blessings of temptation

Journal of Economic Psychology 34 (1): 8–19
Kristian Ove R. Myrseth, Conny Wollbrant (2013)
Subject(s)
Ethics and social responsibility; Human resources management/organizational behavior; Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
inter-temporal choice, pre-commitment, temptation, self-control
JEL Code(s)
D01, D03, D69, D90
We model self-control conflict as a stochastic struggle of an agent against a visceral influence, which impels the agent to act sub-optimally. The agent holds costly pre-commitment technology to avoid the conflict altogether and may decide whether to procure pre-commitment or to confront the visceral influence. We examine naïve expectations for the strength of the visceral influence; underestimating the visceral influence may lead the agent to exaggerate the expected utility of resisting temptation, and so mistakenly forego pre-commitment. Our analysis reveals conditions under which higher willpower – and lower visceral influence – reduces welfare. We further demonstrate that lowering risk aversion could reduce welfare. The aforementioned results call into question certain policy measures aimed at helping people improve their own behavior.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
34
Journal Pages
8–19
Journal Article

Ties that last: Tie formation and persistence in research collaborations over time

Administrative Science Quarterly 58 (1): 69–110
Linus Dahlander, Daniel A. McFarland (2013)
Subject(s)
Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
research collaborations, network ties, tie formation, tie persistence, long-term ties, task relationships
Using a longitudinal dataset of research collaborations over 15 years at Stanford University, we build a theory of intraorganizational task relationships that distinguishes the different factors associated with the formation and persistence of network ties. We highlight six factors: shared organizational foci, shared traits and interests, tie advantages from popularity, tie reinforcement from third parties, tie strength and multiplexity, and the instrumental returns from the products of ties. Findings suggest that ties form when unfamiliar people identify desirable and matching traits in potential partners. By contrast, ties persist when familiar people reflect on the quality of their relationship and shared experiences. The former calls for shallow, short-term strategies for assessing a broad array of potential ties; the latter calls for long-term strategies and substantive assessments of a relationship’s worth so as to draw extended rewards from the association. This suggests that organizational activities geared toward sustaining persistent intraorganizational task relationships need to be different from activities aimed at forging new ones.
With permission of Sage
Volume
58
Journal Pages
69–110
ESMT Working Paper

Product development capability and marketing strategy for new durable products

ESMT Working Paper No. 13-01
Sumitro Banerjee, David A. Soberman (2013)
Subject(s)
Marketing
Keyword(s)
Product development, marketing strategy, durable goods, quality, signaling game
Our objective is to understand how a firm’s product development capability (PDC) affects the launch strategy for a durable product that is sequentially improved over time in a market where consumers have heterogeneous valuations for quality. We show that the launch strategy of firms is affected by the degree to which consumers think ahead. However, only the strategy of firms with high PDC is affected by the observability of quality. When consumers are myopic and quality is observable, both high and low PDC firms use price skimming and restrict sales of the first generation to consumers with high willingness to pay (WTP). A high PDC firm, however, sells the second generation broadly while a low PDC firm only sells the second generation to consumers with low WTP. When consumers are myopic and quality is unobservable, a firm with high PDC signals its quality by offering a low price for the first generation, which results in broad selling. The price of the second generation is set such that only high WTP consumers buy. A firm with low PDC will not mimic this strategy. If a low PDC firm sells the first generation broadly, it cannot discriminate between the high and low WTP consumers. When consumers are forward looking, a firm with high PDC sells the first generation broadly. This mitigates the “Coase problem” created by consumers thinking ahead. It then sells the second generation product only to the high WTP consumers. In contrast, a firm with low PDC does the opposite. It only sells the first generation to high WTP consumers and the second generation broadly.

 

View all ESMT Working Papers in the ESMT Working Paper Series here. ESMT Working Papers are also available via SSRN, RePEc, EconStor, and the German National Library (DNB).

Pages
40
ISSN (Print)
1866–3494
Journal Article

Competencies, personality traits, and organizational rewards of middle managers: A motive-based approach

Human Performance 26 (1): 66–92
Laura Guillén, Willem E. Saris (2013)
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior
Keyword(s)
competencies, personality traits, organizational rewards, motives, socioanalytic theory, middle managers
Volume
26
Journal Pages
66–92
Journal Article

Differentiating market offerings using complexity and co-creation: Implications for customer decision-making uncertainty

European Business Review 25 (1): 65–85
Olaf Plötner, Jan Lakotta, Frank Jacob (2013)
Subject(s)
Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
decision-making uncertainty, industrial market offerings, complex solutions, typology
Customer decision-making uncertainty (DMU) is a persistent phenomenon in business-to-business markets. However, there is substantial variation in the degree customers perceive DMU and hence suppliers should react to it. Based on existing industrial buying typologies, this paper proposes a new classification scheme to explain variance in customer DMU. To this end, market offering complexity and co-creation are used as defining dimensions and four ideal types of industrial market offerings are constructed. We show theoretically that DMU is especially prevalent for complex solutions. The paper closes with guidance for suppliers of industrial market offerings and an outlook for future research.
With permission of Emerald
Volume
25
Journal Pages
65–85
Journal Article

Diagnostic accuracy under congestion

Management Science 59 (1): 157–171
Saed Alizamir, Francis de Véricourt, Peng Sun (2013)
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
service operations, queueing theory, dynamic programming, decision making, information search, Bayes' rule
In diagnostic services, agents typically need to weigh the benefit of running an additional test and improving the accuracy of diagnosis against the cost of delaying the provision of services to others. Our paper analyzes how to dynamically manage this accuracy/congestion trade-off. To that end, we study an elementary congested system facing an arriving stream of customers. The diagnostic process consists of a search problem in which the service provider conducts a sequence of imperfect tests to determine the customer's type. We find that the agent should continue to perform the diagnosis as long as her current belief that the customer is of a given type falls into an interval that depends on the congestion level as well as the number of performed tests thus far. This search interval should shrink as congestion intensifies and as the number of performed tests increases if additional conditions hold. Our study reveals that, contrary to diagnostic services without congestion, the base rate (i.e., the prior probability of the customer type) has an effect on the agent's search strategy. In particular, the optimal search interval shrinks when customer types are more ambiguous a priori, i.e., as the base rate approaches the value at which the agent is indifferent between types. Finally, because of congestion effects, the agent should sometimes diagnose the customer as being of a given type, even if test results indicate otherwise. All these insights disappear in the absence of congestion.
© 2013 INFORMS
This publication was a finalist of the 2016 Service SIG Best Paper Competition.
Volume
59
Journal Pages
157–171
Journal Article

Implications of the state aid modernisation for the assessment of large investment projects

European State Aid Law Quarterly 1: 46–60
Hans W. Friederiszick, Nicola Tosini (2013)
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
competition policy, regional state aid, subsidies, anti-competitive effects
JEL Code(s)
H81, L4, O25, R58
Journal Pages
46–60