Academic articles
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Subject(s)
Diversity and inclusion; Human resources management/organizational behavior
Keyword(s)
network cognition, social network recall, structural holes, gender
Subject(s)
Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Keyword(s)
IPOs, going public, external financing, organizational economics, human resource management
JEL Code(s)
G32, G34, M50, D20
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
model of sales, captives, shoppers, price dispersion, clearinghouse models
JEL Code(s)
D43, L11, M3
Volume
45
Subject(s)
Entrepreneurship; Strategy and general management; Technology, R&D management
© 2025, INFORMS
Subject(s)
Unspecified
Keyword(s)
executive educaiton, teaching managers, business schools, program design, adult education, teaching as a career development
Subject(s)
Information technology and systems; Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
information design, supply chain management, newsvendor model, forecast sharing
ISSN (Online)
1526-5501
ISSN (Print)
0025–1909
Subject(s)
Information technology and systems; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
information technology, IT security law, cybersecurity, European regulation
Volume
52
Journal Pages
105927
ISSN (Online)
1873-6734
ISSN (Print)
0267-3649
Subject(s)
Product and operations management; Strategy and general management; Technology, R&D management
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Trade platform, hybrid business model, antitrust policy, tax policy
JEL Code(s)
D42, L12, L13, L40, H25
We provide a canonical and tractable model of a trade platform enabling buyers and sellers to transact. The platform charges a percentage fee on third-party product sales and decides whether to be "hybrid", like Amazon, by selling its own product. It thereby controls the number of differentiated products (variety) it hosts and their prices. Using the mixed market demand system, we capture interactions between monopolistically competitive sellers and a sizeable platform product. Using long-run aggregative games with free entry, we endogenize seller participation through an aggregate variable manipulated by the platform's fee. We show that a higher quality (or lower cost) of the platform's product increases its market share and the seller fee, and lowers consumer surplus. Banning hybrid mode benefits consumers. The hybrid platform might favor its product and debase third-party products if the own product advantage is sufficiently high. We also provide some tax policy implications.
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
digital identity, e-government, digital transformation