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We provide a canonical and tractable model of a trade platform enabling buyers and sellers to transact. The platform charges a percentage fee on third-party product sales and decides whether to be "hybrid", like Amazon, by selling its own product. It thereby controls the number of differentiated products (variety) it hosts and their prices. Using the mixed market demand system, we capture interactions between monopolistically competitive sellers and a sizeable platform product. Using long-run aggregative games with free entry, we endogenize seller participation through an aggregate variable manipulated by the platform's fee. We show that a higher quality (or lower cost) of the platform's product increases its market share and the seller fee, and lowers consumer surplus. Banning hybrid mode benefits consumers. The hybrid platform might favor its product and debase third-party products if the own product advantage is sufficiently high. We also provide some tax policy implications.

© 2024 The Author(s). The RAND Journal of Economics published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of The RAND Corporation.

In this paper, we explore how to uncover an adverse issue that may occur in organizations with the capability to evade detection. To that end, we formalize the problem of designing efficient auditing and remedial strategies as a dynamic mechanism design model. In this setup, a principal seeks to uncover and remedy an issue that occurs to an agent at a random point in time and that harms the principal if not addressed promptly. Only the agent observes the issue’s occurrence, but the principal may uncover it by auditing the agent at a cost. The agent, however, can exert effort to reduce the audit’s effectiveness in discovering the issue. We first establish that this setup reduces to the optimal stochastic control of a piecewise deterministic Markov process. The analysis of this process reveals that the principal should implement a dynamic cyclic auditing and remedial cost-sharing mechanism, which we characterize in closed form. Importantly, we find that the principal should randomly audit the agent unless the agent’s evasion capacity is not very effective, and the agent cannot afford to self-correct the issue. In this latter case, the principal should follow predetermined audit schedules.

© 2024, INFORMS

Alexander and Lorenzo were at a crossroads with their biotech startup, PhagoMed. They had left high-profile positions at Boston Consulting Group (BCG) three years earlier, driven by a bold vision to tackle the global crisis of antibiotic resistance using phages, viruses with the remarkable ability to target specific bacteria. Despite a robust commitment to R&D yielding deeper insights into phage biology, the journey from lab to clinic was frustratingly slow. And with their capital dwindling, they faced the urgent need to reassess their strategic direction and resource allocation.