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Is it advantageous to make the first offer and to do so ambitiously? Although initial studies suggested clear advantages across cultures and contexts, recent findings have challenged the robustness of this first-mover advantage. A preregistered meta-analysis of 374 effects from 90 studies (Study 1; N = 16,334) revealed three beneficial effects of making the first offer: (a) a general first-mover advantage (g = 0.42, m = 80), (b) a positive correlation between first-offer magnitude and agreement value (r = 0.62, g = 1.56, m = 53), and (c) an advantage of ambitious (vs. moderate) first offers on agreement value (g = 1.14, m = 187). The meta-analysis also identified two detrimental outcomes of ambitious first offers: (d) fewer deals (i.e., more impasses; g = −0.42, m = 13) and (e) worse subjective value experienced by recipients (g = −0.40, m = 41). Two preregistered experiments (Study 2a-2b; N = 2,121) replicated both the beneficial and detrimental meta-analytic effects and simultaneously tested multiple psychological mechanisms driving these effects. Across the experiments, selective accessibility drove the effect of first-offer magnitude on counteroffers, while anger drove the effects on impasses and subjective value. Across both the meta-analysis and the experiments, negotiation complexity moderated both the beneficial and detrimental effects of first offers; as the number and type of issues (i.e., complexity) increased, the effects of first offers became smaller, and the mechanisms changed. Overall, the current meta-analysis and experiments collectively illuminate the direction, size, psychological pathways, and boundaries of first-offer effects in negotiations.

With permission of Elsevier

This paper studies an information design problem of a retailer in a two-tier supply chain that procures a single type of product from a supplier. The supplier needs to decide on a production quantity by balancing the shortage cost and the excess inventory holding cost with respect to the retailer’s demand. The retailer’s demand is random but the retailer receives an informative signal about the demand before the supplier sets the production quantity, and places orders after learning the demand realization. The retailer wants to reduce the shortage cost, and to this end she can disclose information about her signal to persuade the supplier to increase production levels. For this setup, we characterize the optimal information disclosure policy of the retailer, and shed light on settings where the retailer strictly benefits from carefully designed information disclosure policies relative to a full- or a no-disclosure policy.

© 2024, INFORMS

This book is a comprehensive introductory text for academics and management practitioners interested in making first steps in teaching executive education courses. This book helps understand the landscape of executive education, be aware of it key stakeholders and their expectations, and define the first step for entering the field. The book guides the experts in thinking how to turn their knowledge into valuable learning opportunities for executives. It provides information about program and session design and peculiarities of delivering sessions for executive audiences. The book helps envisage possible challenging situations in the classroom, and supports the reader in making use of program evaluations. The book also invites the reader to think about expanding their executive education experience into becoming an academic director - an intellectual leader of an executive course. The book will also be helpful to people entering the field in administrative roles.

Copyright (c) 2025 Matthew S. Bothner, Richard Haynes, Ingo Marquart, Nghi Truong, Hai Anh Vu

© 2025 The Author(s). Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of The British Psychological Society.