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We predict and find that regulated firms’ mandatory disclosures crowd out unregulated firms’ voluntary disclosures. Consistent with information spillovers from regulated to unregulated firms, we document that unregulated firms reduce their own disclosures in the presence of regulated firms’ disclosures. We further find that unregulated firms reduce their disclosures more the greater the strength of the regulatory information spillovers. Our findings suggest that a substitutive relationship between regulated and unregulated firms’ disclosures attenuates the effect of disclosure regulation on the market-wide information environment.

We initiate the study of naivete-based discrimination, the practice of conditioning offers on external information about consumers’ naivete. Knowing that a consumer is naive increases a monopolistic or competitive firm's willingness to generate inefficiency to exploit the consumer's mistakes, so naivete-based discrimination is not Pareto-improving, can be Pareto-damaging, and often lowers total welfare when classical preference-based discrimination does not. Moreover, the effect on total welfare depends on a hitherto unemphasized market feature: the extent to which the exploitation of naive consumers distorts trade with different types of consumers. If the distortion is homogenous across naive and sophisticated consumers, then under an arguably weak and empirically testable condition, naivete-based discrimination lowers total welfare. In contrast, if the distortion arises only for trades with sophisticated consumers, then perfect naivete-based discrimination maximizes social welfare, although imperfect discrimination often lowers welfare. And if the distortion arises only for trades with naive consumers, then naivete-based discrimination has no effect on welfare. We identify applications for each of these cases. In our primary example, a credit market with present-biased borrowers, firms lend more than socially optimal to increase the amount of interest naive borrowers unexpectedly pay, creating a homogenous distortion. The condition for naivete-based discrimination to lower welfare is then weaker than prudence.

This is an open access article.

We analyze conditions facilitating profitable deception in a simple model of a competitive retail market. Firms selling homogenous products set anticipated prices that consumers understand and additional prices that naive consumers ignore unless revealed to them by a firm, where we assume that there is a binding floor on the anticipated prices. Our main results establish that “bad" products (those with lower social surplus than an alternative) tend to be more reliably profitable than “good" products. Specifically, (1) in a market with a single socially valuable product and sufficiently many firms, a deceptive equilibrium - in which firms hide additional prices - does not exist and firms make zero profits. But perversely, (2) if the product is socially wasteful, then a profitable deceptive equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, (3) in a market with multiple products, since a superior product both diverts sophisticated consumers and renders an inferior product socially wasteful in comparison, it guarantees that firms can profitably sell the inferior product by deceiving consumers. We apply our framework to the mutual-fund and credit-card markets, arguing that it explains a number of empirical findings regarding these industries.

This is an open access article.

Alexander and Lorenzo were at a crossroads with their biotech startup, PhagoMed. They had left high-profile positions at Boston Consulting Group (BCG) three years earlier, driven by a bold vision to tackle the global crisis of antibiotic resistance using phages, viruses with the remarkable ability to target specific bacteria. Despite a robust commitment to R&D yielding deeper insights into phage biology, the journey from lab to clinic was frustratingly slow. And with their capital dwindling, they faced the urgent need to reassess their strategic direction and resource allocation.

The pandemic has not wholly derailed DEI as much as feared. The insights from the DEI officers of globally active companies demonstrate optimism and inspiration for those designing DEI strategies in 2022.

Traditional luxury goods companies have treated digital as a channel. But they’re now starting to treat it as a marketplace in its own right, thanks largely to Blockchain technology, which has delivered the Non-Fungible Token. Today, the key ingredients of luxury – rarity, exclusivity, and cost — can also apply to virtual products, as companies like Balenciaga, Louis Vuitton, and Gucci have realized.

While decades of research have demonstrated that networks, through their structural configurations, powerfully influence people’s behaviors, attitudes, and outcomes, recent work has sought to better understand the role of individuals in shaping network processes. There are increasing appeals to devote greater attention to the differences individuals exhibit in establishing, managing, and navigating social relations. Accumulated evidence underlines that 1) individuals may be able to actively position themselves in the network and that 2) agency and purposive action may look different for certain individuals despite occupying similar network positions. In response to these emerging discussions, our symposium aims to contribute to a better understanding of individual agency in network theory. Questions include: What role do individuals play in shaping the process of network evolution? And, how do these dynamics impact the distribution of social capital (positive or negative) among actors within networks? This line of work provides a promising starting point for network agency research. Our presenters’ research highlights that a productive conceptualization of individual agency within organizational networks should be multifaceted. People might strategically leverage social relations and network relations for their own sake without meaningfully changing the structure of their networks. They can also take actions that meaningfully shape the architecture of their networks, intentionally or otherwise. During the processes of individuals exerting agency in shaping their social relations and exploiting network-related advantages, numerous potential mechanisms exist and should be systematically elaborated.

With permission of the Academy of Management