Academic articles
Practitioner articles
Working papers
Books
Book chapters
Case studies
Other publications
Subject(s)
Diversity and inclusion; Human resources management/organizational behavior
Keyword(s)
network cognition, social network recall, structural holes, gender
ISSN (Online)
1744-6570
ISSN (Print)
0031-5826
Subject(s)
Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Keyword(s)
IPOs, going public, external financing, organizational economics, human resource management
JEL Code(s)
G32, G34, M50, D20
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
model of sales, captives, shoppers, price dispersion, clearinghouse models
JEL Code(s)
D43, L11, M3
Volume
45
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment; Information technology and systems
Keyword(s)
data-driven quality improvements, externalities, co-opetition, data sharing
@2025, INFORMS
Journal Pages
1-17
ISSN (Online)
1526-5501
ISSN (Print)
0025–1909
Subject(s)
Entrepreneurship; Strategy and general management; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
organization design, ideas, innovation, evaluation and selection of innovation projects, screening, selection error, false positives and false negatives, mixed methods, longitudinal research design, accelerator, app
How can the selection of innovation projects be designed to reduce false positives and false negatives? Prior research has provided theoretical insights into organizing to reduce errors, yet we know little about how organizations adapt selection over time and the effects of this on selection outcomes. Drawing from qualitative data from 126 interviews conducted over several years, we explore how an accelerator evolved through three selection regimes for high-stakes funding decisions, focusing on the organizational changes and their underlying reasons. We then analyze quantitative data from all 3,580 submissions they received, assessing false positives and false negatives across these regimes. Our findings reveal a persistent occurrence of both types of errors, with relatively small differences across the regimes despite deliberate efforts to enhance the process. In the final regime, which increased submission quality by emphasizing applicant track record and adding additional layers of screening, evaluators surprisingly became more prone to making selection errors. This finding stands net of accounting for (1) differences in the pool of submissions, (2) differences in treatment effects through training and resources provided, (3) learning, and (4) market evolution. By combining qualitative and quantitative data, we explain this through two mechanisms: (1) mean reversion in combination with increased emphasis on applicant track record and (2) within-type adverse selection enabled by a more stringent selection process. The study reveals that evolving an organization’s selection regime may require adjustments across multiple aspects, resulting in unintended consequences.
© 2025, INFORMS
Subject(s)
Unspecified
Keyword(s)
executive educaiton, teaching managers, business schools, program design, adult education, teaching as a career development
Subject(s)
Information technology and systems; Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
information design, supply chain management, newsvendor model, forecast sharing
ISSN (Online)
1526-5501
ISSN (Print)
0025–1909
Subject(s)
Information technology and systems; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
information technology, IT security law, cybersecurity, European regulation
Volume
52
Journal Pages
105927
ISSN (Online)
1873-6734
ISSN (Print)
0267-3649
Subject(s)
Product and operations management; Strategy and general management; Technology, R&D management
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Trade platform, hybrid business model, antitrust policy, tax policy
JEL Code(s)
D42, L12, L13, L40, H25
We provide a canonical and tractable model of a trade platform enabling buyers and sellers to transact. The platform charges a percentage fee on third-party product sales and decides whether to be "hybrid", like Amazon, by selling its own product. It thereby controls the number of differentiated products (variety) it hosts and their prices. Using the mixed market demand system, we capture interactions between monopolistically competitive sellers and a sizeable platform product. Using long-run aggregative games with free entry, we endogenize seller participation through an aggregate variable manipulated by the platform's fee. We show that a higher quality (or lower cost) of the platform's product increases its market share and the seller fee, and lowers consumer surplus. Banning hybrid mode benefits consumers. The hybrid platform might favor its product and debase third-party products if the own product advantage is sufficiently high. We also provide some tax policy implications.