entrepreneurial action, information exposure, opportunity recognition, opportunity evaluation, user entrepreneurship
We study how an individual's exposure to external information regulates the evaluation of entrepreneurial opportunities and entrepreneurial action. Combining data from interviews, a survey, and a comprehensive web log of an online user community spanning eight years, we find that technical information shaped opportunity evaluation and that social information about user needs drove individuals to entrepreneurial action. Our empirical findings suggest that reducing demand uncertainty is a central factor regulating entrepreneurial action, an insight that received theories of entrepreneurial action have so far overlooked.
European competition policy, abuse of dominance, efficiency defense
JEL Code(s)
K21, L21, L40
This article assesses the relevance of efficiencies and other justifications in recent Article 102 TFEU cases. Based on a review of all EU decisions and openings between 2009 and mid 2013 we find that procompetitive justifications still play a mediocre role in the EU Commission’s evaluations, except in IT related abuse cases. This stands in contrast to the policy goals expressed during the reform phase (2005 to 2009), the Guidance Paper and the increasing relevance of efficiency considerations in merger proceedings. We argue that this is due to a malfunctioning of the balancing test, i.e., the weighting of pro- and anticompetitive effects, as pro- and anticompetitive effects are often non-separable and non-monotone in Article 102 TFEU cases. In addition, the increasing practice of commitment decisions reduces transparency; little guidance regarding dynamic efficiencies further diminishes the relevance of business justifications in Article 102 TFEU cases. Policy options are discussed.
Information technology and systems; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
Learning, knowledge acquisition, localization, patent citations, professional service firm
The literature on organizational learning asserts that external learning is often limited geographically and technologically. We scrutinize to what extent organizations acquire external knowledge by accessing external knowledge repositories. We argue that professional service firms (PSFs) grant access to non-localized knowledge repositories and thereby not only facilitate external learning but also help to overcome localization. Focusing on patent law firms, we test our predictions using a unique dataset of 544,820 pairs of EP patent applications. Analyzing patterns of knowledge flows captured in patent citations we find that accessing a PSF’s repository facilitates the acquisition of external knowledge. As the effect is more pronounced for knowledge that is distant to a focal organization we conclude that having access to a knowledge repository compensates for localization disadvantages.
product development, marketing strategy, durable goods, quality, signaling game
Our objective is to understand how a firm’s product development capability (PDC) affects the launch strategy for a durable product that is sequentially improved over time in a market where consumers have heterogeneous valuations for quality. We show that the launch strategy of firms is affected by the degree to which consumers think ahead. However, only the strategy of firms with high PDC is affected by the observability of quality. When consumers are myopic and quality is observable, both high and low PDC firms use price skimming and restrict sales of the first generation to consumers with high willingness to pay (WTP). A high PDC firm, however, sells the second generation broadly while a low PDC firm only sells the second generation to consumers with low WTP. When consumers are myopic and quality is unobservable, a firm with high PDC signals its quality by offering a low price for the first generation, which results in broad selling. The price of the second generation is set such that only high WTP consumers buy. A firm with low PDC will not mimic this strategy. If a low PDC firm sells the first generation broadly, it cannot discriminate between the high and low WTP consumers. When consumers are forward looking, a firm with high PDC sells the first generation broadly. This mitigates the “Coase problem” created by consumers thinking ahead. It then sells the second generation product only to the high WTP consumers. In contrast, a firm with low PDC does the opposite. It only sells the first generation to high WTP consumers and the second generation broadly.
With permission of Elsevier
Volume
30
Journal Pages
276–291
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