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In face of the increasing attention on issues of sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR) by the general public and policy makers, companies have put growing emphasis on ensuring CSR along their supply chains. In this vein, existent research has produced evidence that companies can increase their suppliers’ CSR engagement by exerting explicit pressure on them, e.g., through contractual clauses. Adding to this conventional chain of CSR enforcement, this paper conceptualizes and empirically validates a so far undescribed extended chain of CSR enforcement that also leads to higher levels of a supplier firm’s CSR engagement irrespective and even in the absence of explicit pressure by its customer company. In particular, a customer firm’s CSR orientation in interaction with a powerful position in the supply chain leads suppliers to perceive pressure to engage in CSR regardless of factually exerted pressure. As a result, suppliers are likely to increase their CSR engagement in order to be customer oriented or in preemptive obedience. These results entail substantial implications for policy makers as well as marketing academics and managers.

Prior research has focused on the influence of emotional expressions on the value of negotiated outcomes. Across three studies, we demonstrate that people interacting with angry counterparts become more likely to walk away from a negotiation, resulting in an impasse. In Study 1, participants who encountered counterparts expressing anger were more likely to choose an impasse, relative to those with neutral counterparts. In Study 2, building on the emotion-as-social-information model, we found that inferences of selfishness mediate the effect of angry expressions on impasses. In Study 3, we found that timing moderates the relationship between angry expressions and impasses. Furthermore, we demonstrated that perceptions of inappropriateness mediate the interactive effect of timing and angry expressions on impasses. Taken together, our work reveals that expressing anger is risky in negotiations because people infer that angry counterparts are selfish and become more likely to exit negotiations.

With permission of SAGE Publishing

In April 2017, the Digital Society Institute hosted a workshop entitled "How secure is free software? Security record of open source and free software." The report summarizes the findings of the workshop and gives recommendations for companies and public agencies as well as policy recommendations.

When setting budgets, managers may place constraints on how resources can be used in an effort to mitigate opportunistic behavior by subordinates. These restrictions can affect the ability of the subordinate to succeed in the budgeted task, but may also have an unintended spillover effect on the ability to innovate. Using an experiment, we find that individuals working under higher budgetary constraints are more efficient in their use of budgeted resources, but are less successful in the budgeted tasks, than their counterparts working under lower budgetary constraints. Importantly, we find that imposing budgetary constraints also causes employees to subsequently generate fewer highly original and creative ideas in an unrelated activity. These findings suggest that budget structures can have unintended consequences on the innovative capabilities of organizations. This paper contributes to the expansive budgeting literature by showing budgetary control design has organizational performance implications beyond the specified budgeted activity.

 

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