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Organizations crowdsource ideas from individuals. Individuals whose ideas are not selected for implementation often stop to interact with the organization and submit not further ideas. We hypothesize that organizations can motivate newcomers to submit further ideas by providing a so far understudied form of feedback: rejections. We draw on theories of interaction rituals and matching to develop theory how rejections foster a bond between individuals and organizations. To test our theory we examine the crowdsourcing of 70,196 organizations who receive ideas from 962,570 individuals. We make use of difference in how rejections are written to disentangle the mechanisms how rejections affect individuals willingness to continue to interact with the organization. We discuss the implications for research on idea crowdsourcing, social bonding, and creative processes.

This article describes the newly enacted or rewritten regulations for the defense against IT attacks as part of IT security law: first the relevant criminal offenses, then the powers of the police and intelligence services, then of the IT security authorities and Internet providers. At the end, the political statements for the 19th parliamentary term will be compared with the remaining need for action in IT security law. Furthermore, the future of IT security law will be discussed in the context of implementation, ongoing development and consolidation.

Research has examined who gains authority in knowledge production communities, but has neglected the community members granting authority. We ask: when do community members engage in the authority granting process and why do they support or oppose a candidate? We theorize that community members willingness to engage in the authority granting process depends on their task similarity. We depart from earlier literature by arguing that task similarity is a two-edged sword as a source of support and opposition, which we explain is related to strategic considerations of the voter. Using a unique dataset of all Wikipedia elections from 2003 to 2014, we study when community members vote and whether they vote in favor or against candidates standing for election for administrator positions.

This paper advances novel theory and evidence on the emergence of informal leadership networks in groups that feature no formally designated leaders or authority hierarchies. Integrating insights from relational schema and network theory, we develop and empirically test a 3-step process model. The model’s first hypothesis is that people use a “linear-ordering schema” to process information about leadership relations. Taking this hypothesis as a premise, the second hypothesis argues that whenever an individual experiences a particular leadership attribution to be inconsistent with the linear-ordering schema, s/he will tend to reduce the ensuing cognitive inconsistency by modifying that leadership attribution. Finally, the third hypothesis builds on this inconsistency-reduction mechanism to derive implications about a set of network-structural features (asymmetry, a-cyclicity, transitivity, popularity, and inverse-popularity) that are predicted to endogenously emerge as a group’s informal leadership network evolves. We find broad support for our proposed theoretical model using a multi-method, multi-study approach combining experimental and empirical data. Our study contributes to the organizational literature by illuminating a socio-cognitive dynamics underpinning the evolution of informal leadership structures in groups where formal authority plays a limited role.

© 2018, INFORMS

We suggest foundations for the Shapley value and for the naïve solution, which assigns to any player the difference between the worth of the grand coalition and its worth after this player left the game. To this end, we introduce the decomposition of solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility. A decomposer of a solution is another solution that splits the former into a direct part and an indirect part. While the direct part (the decomposer) measures a player's contribution in a game as such, the indirect part indicates how she affects the other players' direct contributions by leaving the game. The Shapley value turns out to be unique decomposable decomposer of the naïve solution.

With permission of Elsevier