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Im Hinblick auf die endgültige Öffnung der europäischen Energiemärkte im Juli 2007 sehen sich die ursprünglich nationalen Versorger der Gefahr sinkender Marktanteile im Heimatmarkt, aber auch der Chance, das internationale Geschäft zu forcieren, gegenüber. Nachdem sowohl die deutschen als auch die ausländischen Energieversorger bereits in den 90-iger Jahren und verstärkt ab der Jahrtausendwende mit den Privatisierungen in Osteuropa international tätig wurden, befindet sich die Industrie nun in einer Phase der europäischen Konsolidierung. Zeichen hierfür sind die versuchte Übernahme von Endesa durch E.ON, die Enel als "weißen Ritter" auf das Spielfeld brachte, die gelungene Übernahme von Scottish Power durch Iberdrola oder von Gaz de France und Electrabel durch Suez. Folglich stellt sich die Frage, ob die deutschen Energieunternehmen die Neuverteilung der europäischen Energiemarktanteile für sich nutzen können. Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage sind drei Aspekte zu betrachten: i. Haben die deutschen Energieunternehmen im Vergleich zu ihren europäischen Konkurrenten die nötigen Kompetenzen, um den europäischen Konsolidierungsprozess treiben zu können? ii. Ist die Marktdefinition "Integrierte Strom-/ Gasunternehmen" für die Beantwortung dieser Frage die richtige Abgrenzung? iii.Welche Implikationen erschließen sich daraus für die deutschen Energieversorger?

Consumers aware of a new benefit will often experience uncertainty about its personal relevance or usage value. This paper shows that the decision to deliberate further to resolve this uncertainty and reach a polarized judgment of personal relevance critically depends on the posted price. In particular, a price above the consumer's initial willingness to pay might be thought provoking and enhance the perception of relevance with a certain probability. This behavioral mechanism is introduced formally and by way of an experiment with reference to the purchase of organic lettuce and fair-trade coffee. Accounting for the effect of price as a stimulus to think, a monopolistic firm should either over price ("transgressive pricing") or under price ("regressive pricing") in comparison to the consumer's willingness to pay. Under certain circumstances, the firm should also empower consumers with means that reduce the effort of deliberation.

© 2007 INFORMS

Launched in early 2005, Zopa is a peer-to-peer online brokerage that couples British residents who want to lend with those who want to borrow. The company represents a new business model in the retail financial services industry, and since Zopa is not technically a bank and does not lend money itself, the capital requirements to run the business are relatively small. Compared to a traditional full service bank Zopa concentrates on only a few steps of the value chain. This case study provides an overview of the financial service industry, especially banks, in the UK in 2006 and how Zopa, a value innovator, has developed a unique position in the market through an innovative business model. Rich data especially on banking trends are given. Additional data on key players in the industry are supplied. This data will enable students to develop a good understanding of the elements of a value innovation and how technologies have the potential to shake up an established industry structure and its key players. A focus is on the concept of value innovation and sustainable competitive advantage. The case can also be used to address the topic of how incumbent firms should respond to innovative new business models.

The case provides an overview of the financial service industry in the UK in 2006 and how Zopa, a value innovator, has developed a unique position in the market through an innovative business model. Rich data especially on banking trends are given. Additional data on key players in the industry are supplied. This data will enable students to develop a good understanding of the elements of a value innovation and how technologies have the potential to shake up an established industry structure and its key players. A focus is on the concept of value innovation and sustainable competitive advantage.

This paper allows for endogenous costs in the estimation of price cost margins. In particular, we estimate price-cost margins when firms bargain over wages. We extent the standard two-equation set-up (demand and first-order condition in the product market) to include a third equation, which is derived from bargaining over wages. In this way, price-cost margins are determined by wages and vice versa. We implement the model using data for eight European airlines from 1976-1994, and show that the treatment of endogenous costs has important implications for the measurement of price-cost margins and the assessment of market power. Our main result is that observed prices in Europe are virtually identical to monopoly prices, even though observed margins are consistent with Nash behavior. Apparently, costs had been inflated to the point that the European consumers were faced with a de facto monopoly prices.

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006