Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Default options, online platforms, charitable giving, field experiment
JEL Code(s)
D03, D01, D64, C93
Volume
101
Journal Pages
808–826
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior; Strategy and general management
ISSN (Print)
0015-6914
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior
Keyword(s)
Crisis management, error management, inquiry, leadership
Through two studies we observed, that leaders must make a concerted effort to encourage assertiveness and speak-up behavior in their area of responsibility by asking open-ended questions before posing solutions, even (and especially) in high-stakes and urgent situations. When people are under pressure, it’s not uncommon for many to shut down and grow quiet as oppose to proactive. This is why inquiry must be used as a means for getting information — especially during crises. Further, leader’s encouragement will help to create an environment of psychological safety, and the solutions they gather will be much better for it. A business framework that emphasizes leading with questions, and one that trains and retains leaders with this skill set, is capable of achieving operational excellence.
ISSN (Print)
0017-8012
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment; Information technology and systems; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
cybersecurity, digital sovereignty
Cybersicherheit ist für Europa zu einer Schlüsselfrage der globalen digitalen Transformation geworden. Mit dem Cybersecurity Act, also der Cybersicherheitsverordnung, hat die EU einen rechtlichen Rahmen mit dem Anspruch globaler Ausstrahlung vorgelegt. Eingebettet in eine Politik, die digitale Souveränität mit strategischer Verflechtung kombiniert, kann die Verordnung das Tor zu einem dritten Weg Europas im Cyberraum sein, der zwischen dem US-amerikanischen Modell der Marktfreiheit und dem chinesischen Modell des autori- tären Staatskapitalismus verläuft. Der Cybersecurity Act wird verbindlicher Handlungsrahmen und Rückenwind für die bundesdeutsche Cybersicherheitspolitik sein.
Pages
7
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods; Strategy and general management
Keyword(s)
Luck, management success,
Case studies of business and management success tend to focus on factors such as leadership, innovation, competition, and geography, but what about good fortune? This book highlights luck as a key idea for business and society.
The author provides insights from economics, sociology, political science, philosophy, and psychology to create a brief intellectual history of luck. In positioning luck as a key idea in management, the book analyzes various facets of fortune such as randomness, serendipity, and opportunity. Often overlooked given psychological bias toward meritocratic explanations, this book quantifies luck to establish the idea in a more central role in understanding variations in business performance.
In bringing the concept of luck in from the periphery, this concise book is a readable overview of management which will help students, scholars, and reflective practitioners see the subject in a new light.
The author provides insights from economics, sociology, political science, philosophy, and psychology to create a brief intellectual history of luck. In positioning luck as a key idea in management, the book analyzes various facets of fortune such as randomness, serendipity, and opportunity. Often overlooked given psychological bias toward meritocratic explanations, this book quantifies luck to establish the idea in a more central role in understanding variations in business performance.
In bringing the concept of luck in from the periphery, this concise book is a readable overview of management which will help students, scholars, and reflective practitioners see the subject in a new light.
Volume
1st ed.,
Pages
112
ISBN
9781138094246
ISBN (Online)
9781315106144
Subject(s)
Entrepreneurship; Human resources management/organizational behavior
Keyword(s)
teams, ideation, entrepreneurial performance, field experiment
JEL Code(s)
L23, L26, M5
Subject(s)
Marketing
Keyword(s)
Luxury, branding
ISSN (Print)
0015-6914
Subject(s)
Human resources management/organizational behavior; Strategy and general management; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
innovation, HR, inventor mobility, alliance formation
While losing a valuable employee to competition shouldn't be celebrated, it does provide an opportunity for innovation and collaboration
© copyright Mark Allen Group 2019
Subject(s)
Management sciences, decision sciences and quantitative methods
Keyword(s)
Capacity investment, optimal contracts, capital diversion, financial constraints, newsvendor model, moral hazard
We study a firm's capacity choice under demand uncertainty given it must finance this investment externally.
Sharing profits with investors causes governance problems affecting both capacity and demand: the firm may “steal" capital, which reduces effective capacity, and \shirk" on market-development, which reduces demand. We adopt an optimal contracting approach whereby the firm optimizes among feasible financial claims derived endogenously. We characterize its optimal financing and capacity choices. First, debt financing is optimal: it minimizes the incentives to both divert and shirk. Second, the firm underinvests (overinvests) if the effort problem is mild (severe) enough relative to the diversion problem. Thus, a worsening of the same governance problem can lead to over- or underinvestment depending on circumstances. Third, we find that the diversion and shirking problems interact in their impact on capacity investment. In particular, if the shirking problem is mild enough, the more severe the diversion problem, the less the firm invests. However, if the shirking problem is severe enough, the effect of diversion is reversed: the more severe the diversion problem, the more the firm invests.
Sharing profits with investors causes governance problems affecting both capacity and demand: the firm may “steal" capital, which reduces effective capacity, and \shirk" on market-development, which reduces demand. We adopt an optimal contracting approach whereby the firm optimizes among feasible financial claims derived endogenously. We characterize its optimal financing and capacity choices. First, debt financing is optimal: it minimizes the incentives to both divert and shirk. Second, the firm underinvests (overinvests) if the effort problem is mild (severe) enough relative to the diversion problem. Thus, a worsening of the same governance problem can lead to over- or underinvestment depending on circumstances. Third, we find that the diversion and shirking problems interact in their impact on capacity investment. In particular, if the shirking problem is mild enough, the more severe the diversion problem, the less the firm invests. However, if the shirking problem is severe enough, the effect of diversion is reversed: the more severe the diversion problem, the more the firm invests.
Copyright © 2019, INFORMS
Volume
65
Journal Pages
4951–5448
ISSN (Online)
1526-5501
ISSN (Print)
0025–1909
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment; Information technology and systems; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
Telecom mergers, static and dynamic efficiency, difference-in-difference
JEL Code(s)
L22, O33, G34, L96
This paper studies five mergers in the European wireless telecommunication industry and analyzes their impact on prices and capital expenditures of both merging carriers and their rivals. We find substantial heterogeneity in the relationship between increases in concentration and carriers’ prices. The specifics of each merger case clearly matter. Moreover, we find a positive correlation between the price and the investment effects; when the prices after merger increase (decrease), the investments increase (decrease) too. Thus, we document a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiencies of mergers.
Copyright © 2019, The Author(s)
Volume
55
Journal Pages
375–402