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Subject(s)
Ethics and social responsibility
Keyword(s)
Sustainability, corporate responsibility
Volume
2010–11
Journal Pages
28–31
Subject(s)
Ethics and social responsibility
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Secondary Title
The pros and cons of consumer protection
Pages
44–76
ISBN
978–91–88566–48–5
Subject(s)
Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Keyword(s)
bank competition, microfinance, microcredit, microbank, loan rates, information dispersion, PAR, portfolio quality
JEL Code(s)
D4, G21, L1, O1
We study the effects of competition on loan rates and portfolio-at-risk in microcredit markets using a new database from rating agencies, covering 379 microbanks located in 67 countries between 2002 and 2008. Our study reveals different competitive effects in nonprofit and for-profit microbanks. We find that for-profit microbanks charge significantly lower rates and exhibit improved portfolio-at-risk in less concentrated markets. In particular, the effect of concentration on loan rates is nearly three times the one reported in previous studies in banking. In contrast, nonprofit microbanks are relatively insensitive to changes in concentration. We control for interest rate ceilings, which very significantly reduce rates in for-profit microbanks. However, our study also uncovers a competitive interplay between for-profit and nonprofit microbanks. In particular, the PAR of nonprofit microbanks deteriorates when the proportion of profit-oriented microbanks increases. Finally, we find evidence consistent with dispersion of borrower-specific information among competing microbanks in the for-profit sector, even after controlling for the presence of credit registries.
View all ESMT Working Papers in the ESMT Working Paper Series here. ESMT Working Papers are also available via SSRN, RePEc, EconStor, and the German National Library (DNB).
Pages
57
ISSN (Print)
1866–3494
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
Incentives, structural change, moral hazard, professional sports
JEL Code(s)
D82, J41, L14, M52
Volume
232
Journal Pages
258–278
ISSN (Online)
2366-049X
ISSN (Print)
0021–4027
Subject(s)
Ethics and social responsibility; Strategy and general management
Volume
87
Journal Pages
48–49
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
productivity, information technologies, organizational practices, panel data
JEL Code(s)
O33, D22, D24
Volume
12
Journal Pages
1–39
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment; Strategy and general management; Technology, R&D management
Keyword(s)
energy system, regulation, innovation, networks, infrastructure, information and communication technology
JEL Code(s)
D47, D72, D78, H42, L33
Secondary Title
Future Energy Grid: Migrationspfade ins Internet der Energie
ISBN
978-3-642-27863-1
Subject(s)
Economics, politics and business environment
Keyword(s)
telecommunications, access regulation, unbundling, investment
JEL Code(s)
C51, L59, L96
We provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between access regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering 70+ fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates: different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants; a strategic interaction of entrants' and incumbents' investments; and endogenous regulation. We find access regulation to negatively affect both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus promoting market entry by means of regulated access undermines incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. Moreover, we find evidence of a regulatory commitment problem: higher incumbents' investments encourage provision of regulated access.
With permission of the University of Chicago Press
Volume
55
Journal Pages
189–216
Subject(s)
Finance, accounting and corporate governance
Volume
47
Journal Pages
2–3
ISSN (Online)
1613-964X
ISSN (Print)
0020-5346