Publication database

Individuals in a social dilemma may experience a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and their better judgment to cooperate. Pairing a public goods game with a subtle framing technique, we test whether perception of self-control conflict strengthens the association between self-control and cooperation. Consistent with our hypothesis, cooperative behavior is positively associated with self-control for individuals in the treatment that raised the relative likelihood of perceiving conflict, but not associated with self-control in the treatment that lowered the likelihood. These results help advance our understanding of the role of self-control in social interaction.

Current theorizing suggests that the valence of an affective state alone cannot explain indulgent consumption but that this is contingent on whether indulging can improve a negative state or will not hurt a positive state. This research shows that when an emotion is associated with the appraisal of uncertainty (certainty), consumers infer that their affective state can (cannot) change. As a result, people in a negative affective state will indulge more when their affect is associated with uncertainty because indulging can help repair the negative state, but people in a positive affective state will indulge more when their affective state is associated with certainty because indulging will not hurt their positive state. Reconciling earlier research reporting apparently inconsistent results linking emotional valence, affect regulation, and indulgence, these findings suggest that the certainty appraisal of specific emotions is important in predicting indulgent consumption to regulate one’s affect. Implications are discussed.

The Regional Aid Guidelines foresee specific screens for an in-depth assessment of Large Investment Projects (LIPs): an in-depth assessment is initiated if the market share of the aid beneficiary is above 25% or the investment results in a capacity expansion above 5% in a declining market. It is currently being discussed within the broader State Aid Modernization package and also due to a recent court ruling on the case Propapier whether these market screens should stay as they are. Based on a dataset of all LIP cases notified under the 2006 Regional Aid Guidelines, we evaluate those market screens and find that the screens do have power to identify problematic cases – cases with a below average expected aid effectiveness and aid measures targeting specific industries. We also find, however, that the market screens are affected by a severe implementation problem and, hence, do not help to shorten phase I investigations. From a conceptual perspective, they are also not capable of identifying some of the potentially most problematic regional State aid cases. Policy options are discussed.

Status-seeking behaviors are linked to executive career progression, but do leaders appreciate being surrounded by followers eager to move up in the organizational hierarchy? Building on the self-enhancement theory, we propose that leaders with high self-assessed getting-ahead behaviors give better performance evaluations to subordinates who also have willingness to get ahead behaviors. In contrast, leaders with low self-assessed getting-ahead behaviors are quite reserved about the performance of subordinates high in the getting-ahead dimension. We also propose that overall, ambitious leaders evaluate more positively their followers’ performance than leaders with more modest desire to get ahead. We suggest that this effect is magnified when the status differential between the leader and the follower is reduced due to differences in age or hierarchical level (i.e., a younger leader or too few hierarchical levels between the leader and the subordinate). The results obtained by using polynomial regression and response surface techniques to analyze a sample of 138 leader-follower dyads supported our hypotheses showing a supervisor’s contextual performance ratings skew rooted in leaders’ desire to get ahead. We conclude by deriving the theoretical and practical implications of these findings.

Drawing on identity and social comparison theories, we propose and test a model of motivation to lead based on two types of self-to-role comparisons (i.e., self-comparisons with specific leaders and with more abstract representations of the leadership role). We propose that these comparisons imply different identity verification purposes and have different consequences on the motivation of individuals. The results obtained by using structural equation models and response surface techniques among a sample of 180 executives support our predictions. We hypothesize and find that a perceived similarity with a significant leader has a positive effect on the motivation to lead and that this relationship is mediated by self-efficacy perceptions. We also find that the affective, but not the social-normative component, is higher when there is self-role congruence with respect to leadership dimensions such as “power” and “affiliation”. We discuss theoretical and practical implications for leadership and the subjective fit at work.

The importance of intellectual property (IP) rights for commercializing innovation is well established. Moreover, separate streams of literature have shown a positive relationship between IP rights and both product licensing and third-party (especially VC) financing. However, since raising third-party finance enables an innovating firm to continue commercializing its innovation alone, it is not clear how obtaining IP rights will impact the choice between licensing product rights and continuing to commercialize the product alone. This paper attempts to reconcile these two alternative effects of obtaining IP rights and the implications for commercialization strategy. The paper empirically examines the relationship between the status of the primary patent covering an innovation and whether the innovating firm’s licenses its innovation or raises external finance. The results show that while filing and allowance of the primary significantly increases the likelihood of raising finance at certain stages of the firm/product’s development, and thereby enable the firm to delay licensing, obtaining patent rights has a much larger, positive effect on licensing. While it is not possible to identify the drivers of these different effects from the empirical analysis, the theory suggests that patent filing may act as a signal to financial investors that enable early-stage firms to raise finance, but ultimately they are most valuable as appropriability mechanisms for facilitating financing.

We study how two distinct types of pre-entry experience – core technological experience and market-based complementary experience – affect post-entry performance in a new industry. We focus on the fit between capabilities generated through pre-entry experience and the preferences of heterogeneous consumer segments. Specifically, we suggest that firms with pre-entry experience in the focal technology will attract more valuable consumers, but as these consumers typically make adoption decisions early the firm must enter early to benefit. Conversely, firms with pre-entry experience in the focal market will attract a larger share of less valuable consumers regardless of entry timing. Our empirical analysis of the global 2G mobile telecommunications industry supports our theory and provides important insights for research on experience and entry dynamics in high-technology industries.

We study the effects of competition on loan rates and portfolio-at-risk in microcredit markets using a new database from rating agencies, covering 379 microbanks located in 67 countries between 2002 and 2008. Our study reveals different competitive effects in nonprofit and for-profit microbanks. We find that for-profit microbanks charge significantly lower rates and exhibit improved portfolio-at-risk in less concentrated markets. In particular, the effect of concentration on loan rates is nearly three times the one reported in previous studies in banking. In contrast, nonprofit microbanks are relatively insensitive to changes in concentration. We control for interest rate ceilings, which very significantly reduce rates in for-profit microbanks. However, our study also uncovers a competitive interplay between for-profit and nonprofit microbanks. In particular, the PAR of nonprofit microbanks deteriorates when the proportion of profit-oriented microbanks increases. Finally, we find evidence consistent with dispersion of borrower-specific information among competing microbanks in the for-profit sector, even after controlling for the presence of credit registries.