Publication database

Even if we strive for an organizational learning culture that does not punish mistakes and failure, implementation is difficult. Especially when damage has been done, people are quick to talk about "culprits" and "sanctions," but this benefits no one. Analysis of the failure usually reveals that several factors played a role. Talking openly about this requires that the employees feel psychologically safe.
In aviation, openly dealing with mistakes is not only tolerated, but actively demanded. There, it is not the error that is the problem, but the unrecognized – or worse – the unreported error. This leads to the seemingly paradoxical result that, in the area of a high-risk organization of all places, the open, non-punitive handling of errors is the norm. The focus is on learning from mistakes in order to be able to avoid them henceforth. This principle should also apply to companies that want to reduce the errors that occur in their projects and processes.

Extant research in organizational networks has provided critical insights into understanding the benefits of occupying a brokerage position. More recently, researchers have moved beyond the brokerage position to consider the brokering processes (arbitration and collaboration) brokers engage in and their implications for performance. However, brokering processes are typically measured using scales that reflect individuals’ orientation toward engaging in a behavior, rather than the behavior itself. In this article, we propose a measure that captures the behavioral process of brokering. The measure indicates the extent to which actors engage in arbitration versus collaboration based on sequences of time stamped relational events, such as emails, message boards, and recordings of meetings. We demonstrate the validity of our measure as well as its predictive ability. By leveraging the temporal information inherent in sequences of relational events, our behavioral measure of brokering creates opportunities for researchers to explore the dynamics of brokerage and their impact on individuals, and also paves the way for a systematic examination of the temporal dynamics of networks.

With permission of SAGE Publishing

Arrow et al. (1949) introduced the first sequential search problem, “where at each stage the options available are to stop and take a definite action or to continue sampling for more information." We study how time pressure in the form of task accumulation may affect this decision problem. To that end, we consider a search problem where the decision maker (DM) faces a stream of random decision tasks to be treated one at a time, and accumulate when not attended to. We formulate the problem of managing this form of pressure as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process, and characterize the corresponding optimal policy. We find that the DM needs to alleviate this pressure very differently depending on how the search on the current task has unfolded thus far. As the search progresses, the DM is less and less willing to sustain high levels of workloads in the beginning and end of the search, but actually increases the maximum workload she is willing to handle in the middle of the process. The DM manages this workload by first making a priori decisions to release some accumulated tasks, and later by aborting the current search and deciding based on her updated belief. This novel search strategy critically depends on the DM's prior belief about the tasks, and stems, in part, from an effect related to the decision ambivalence. These findings are robust to various extensions of our basic set-up.

© 2019, INFORMS

With the growing interest in employer attractiveness, research is unsystematic on how this phenomenon can be conceptualized and studied. Studies tend to make little conceptual differentiation regarding for whom employers should be attractive, and therefore, address the perspectives of potential as well as current employees, who work in organizations for long periods of time. In this study our arguments relate to the phenomenon’s conceptual clarity as well as its differentiation from other related concepts. By focusing on employer attractiveness for current employees, we have systematically reviewed 48 studies published in business and management journals, and categorized findings into the Inputs-Mediators-Outputs model. This approach allowed us to depict significant limitations in the existing knowledge about employer attractiveness from the current employees’ perspective, and offer avenues for future research. Next, to delineate the future research agenda, we have concluded this study with a discussion on what our findings mean for managers and organizations.

© 2022 Dassler, Khapova, Lysova and Korotov

Cash flows to hedge funds are highly sensitive to performance streaks, a streak being defined as subsequent quarters during which a fund performs above or below a benchmark, even after controlling for a wide range of common performance measures. At the same time, streaks have limited predictive power regarding future fund performance. This suggests investors weigh information suboptimally, and their decisions are driven too strongly by a belief in continuation of good performance, consistent with the “hot hand fallacy.” The hedge funds that investors choose to invest in do not perform significantly better than those they divest from. These findings are consistent with overreaction to certain types of information and do not support the notion that sophisticated investors have superior information or superior information processing abilities.

© 2021, INFORMS

Conflict management scholars study mixed-motive negotiation situations with cooperative and competitive incentives predominantly through multi-issue negotiation tasks in experimental studies. Intriguingly, experimenters currently lack an objective, generalizable, and continuous measure that precisely quantifies the incentives underlying these negotiation tasks. We present the conflict strength coefficient, which enables scholars to systematically quantify the incentive structures in these multi-issue negotiation tasks. By making the incentive structures accessible and numerically comparable, the conflict strength coefficient provides new insights into the central element of the experimental study of negotiation and conflict management, unmasks differences across existing tasks, facilitates research transparency, knowledge sharing, and open science practices. We demonstrate the coefficient’s benefits by providing a hands-on example from past research, by reviewing and quantitatively assessing the current literature, and by mapping conflict strength coefficients for the negotiation and conflict management research landscape and its subareas. Our analysis suggests that the conflict strength coefficient can enrich the understanding of cooperative and competitive incentives in the established tasks and directly guide and support an individual scholar’s process of knowledge creation. The conflict strength coefficient provides a methodological contribution to the experimental study of conflict management and negotiation with immediate benefits for the production of scientific knowledge, the experimental study of real-world phenomena, and theory development.