Publication database

This paper studies the interplay between the operational and financial facets of capacity investment. We consider the capacity choice problem of a firm with limited liquidity and whose access to external capital markets is hampered by moral hazard. The firm must therefore not only calibrate its capacity investment and the corresponding funding needs, but also optimize its sourcing of funds. Importantly, the set of available sources of funds is derived endogenously and includes standard financial claims (debt, equity, etc.). We find that when higher demand realizations are more indicative of high effort, debt financing is optimal for any given capacity level. In this case, the optimal capacity is never below the efficient capacity level but sometimes strictly above that level. Further, the optimal capacity level increases with the moral hazard problem's severity and decreases with the firm's internal funds. This runs counter to the newsvendor logic and to the common intuition that by raising the cost of external capital and hence the unit capacity cost, financial market frictions should lower the optimal capacity level. We trace the value of increasing capacity beyond the efficient level to a bonus effect and a demand elicitation effect. Both stem from the risk of unmet demand, which is characteristic of capacity decisions under uncertainty.

This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of guarantees for German Landesbanken which results in lower credit ratings, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. This removal was announced in 2001, but Landesbanken were allowed to issue guaranteed bonds until 2005. We find that Landesbanken lend to riskier borrowers after 2001. This effect is most pronounced for Landesbanken with the highest expected decrease in franchise value. Landesbanken also significantly increased their off-balance sheet exposure to the global ABCP market. Our results provide implications for the debate on how to remove guarantees.

A firm that lacks the specialized complementary assets necessary to commercialize an innovation faces a trade-off between contracting with an incumbent to access those assets and integrating downstream into commercialization. According to the framework developed in the prior literature, under a strong appropriability regime the innovator is likely to be better off contracting with an incumbent (as long as it can negotiate reasonable terms). However, we argue that if the innovator can learn from its experience in product commercialization, and thereby build its own commercialization capabilities, then the benefits of integrating downstream may outweigh the opportunity costs of learning and foregone profits. Alternatively, by engaging in joint commercialization, the innovator may be able to avoid these opportunity costs, albeit at the expense of higher inter-organizational governance costs. We illustrate the relationship between the choice of commercialization mode, commercialization experience, and performance in the context of the pharmaceutical industry. Specifically, we study how commercialization mode and experience affects the likelihood of drug approval. We find that when innovators lacking commercialization experience participate in the commercialization process though either joint commercialization or by commercializing alone, the product is less likely to be approved. However, innovators that have participated in the commercialization process in the past are more likely to successfully commercialize subsequent innovations under joint commercialization than those which have only contracted the commercialization to an incumbent. The results suggest that in some circumstances participating in the commercialization process, either through self-commercialization or by engaging in joint commercialization, may be the optimal strategy even for firms without the requisite complementary assets.

This article assesses the relevance of efficiencies and other justifications in recent Article 102 TFEU cases. Based on a review of all EU decisions and openings between 2009 and mid 2013 we find that procompetitive justifications still play a mediocre role in the EU Commission’s evaluations, except in IT related abuse cases. This stands in contrast to the policy goals expressed during the reform phase (2005 to 2009), the Guidance Paper and the increasing relevance of efficiency considerations in merger proceedings. We argue that this is due to a malfunctioning of the balancing test, i.e., the weighting of pro- and anticompetitive effects, as pro- and anticompetitive effects are often non-separable and non-monotone in Article 102 TFEU cases. In addition, the increasing practice of commitment decisions reduces transparency; little guidance regarding dynamic efficiencies further diminishes the relevance of business justifications in Article 102 TFEU cases. Policy options are discussed.

The literature on organizational learning asserts that external learning is often limited geographically and technologically. We scrutinize to what extent organizations acquire external knowledge by accessing external knowledge repositories. We argue that professional service firms (PSFs) grant access to non-localized knowledge repositories and thereby not only facilitate external learning but also help to overcome localization. Focusing on patent law firms, we test our predictions using a unique dataset of 544,820 pairs of EP patent applications. Analyzing patterns of knowledge flows captured in patent citations we find that accessing a PSF’s repository facilitates the acquisition of external knowledge. As the effect is more pronounced for knowledge that is distant to a focal organization we conclude that having access to a knowledge repository compensates for localization disadvantages.