Publication database

This paper analyzes organizations’ attempts to entice external contributors to submit suggestions for future organizational action. While earlier work has elaborated on the advantages of leveraging the knowledge of external contributors, our findings show that organizational attempts to attract such involvement are more likely to wither or die. We develop arguments about what increases the likelihood of getting suggestions from externals in the future, namely through (1) proactive attention (submitting internally developed suggestions to externals to stimulate debate); and (2) reactive attention (paying attention to suggestions from externals to signal they are being listened to), particularly when those suggestions are submitted by newcomers. Findings from an analysis of about 24,000 initiatives by organizations to involve external contributors suggest these actions are crucial for receiving suggestions from external contributors. Our results are contingent upon the stage of the initiative because organizations’ actions exert more influence in initiatives that lack a history of prior suggestions. Our work has implications for scholars of open innovation because it highlights the importance of considering failures as well successes: focusing exclusively on initiatives that reach a certain stage can lead to partial or erroneous conclusions about why some organizations engage external contributors while others fail.

With permission of Elsevier

Partnerships can be found in many areas of social and economic life. These arrangements have become particularly common in research and development activities where organizations increasingly look for partners to complement their own technological capabilities with a view to create innovative products and processes. R&D partnerships, however, are fraught with challenges because the conditions for creativity through cooperation are still not fully understood. Academic partnerships are also very common and offer a fertile ground for investigation. Academic cooperation takes many different forms and results in a wide range of outcomes (Laband and Tollison, 2000). One of the most visible outcomes is co-authored publications (Melin and Persson, 1996). Nowadays, there is extensive data available about both the context of these partnerships as well as the quality of their outcome. This paper explores the determinants of the gain for authors who cooperate through co-authorship in the publication of academic articles. We distinguish between short-term benefits (i.e. the increase in citations of the co-authored article relative to the authors’ previous publications) and the long-term ones (i.e. the increase in citations of articles subsequent to the co-authored piece). We find evidence that these benefits have different determinants for co-authors depending on their past experience. While co-authorship generally seems to benefit more the junior (younger and with a lower academic reputation) author, the senior partner can reduce the gap with a strong personal track record and co-authoring experience.

With permission of Elsevier

A study involving a Global 500 company finds that frontline employees’ perceptions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) can contribute to their customer orientation (self-rated) and objective job performance (supervisor-rated) by activating social identification processes. Employees identify with the organization based in part on the extent to which CSR is supported by salient and job-relevant others both internal and external to the organization. Looking internally, employees identify with the organization to the extent that they perceive management to support CSR. Looking externally, employees can identify with customers (called employee-customer identification) to the extent they perceive customers to support the company’s CSR. Both effects are enhanced when employees feel CSR is an important (versus non-important) part of their self-concept. Organizational identification directly drives job performance while employee-customer identification contributes to job performance through its effects on organizational identification and customer orientation.

With the permission of the American Marketing Association

The integration of systems for pricing and revenue management must trade off potential revenue gains against significant practical and technical challenges. This dilemma motivates us to investigate the value of coordinating decisions on prices and capacity allocation in a stylized setting. We propose two pairs of sequential policies for making static decisions—on pricing and revenue management—that differ in their degree of integration (hierarchical versus coordinated) and their pricing inputs (deterministic versus stochastic). For a large class of stochastic, price-dependent demand models, we prove that these four heuristics admit tractable solutions satisfying intuitive sensitivity properties. We further evaluate numerically the performance of these policies relative to a fully coordinated model, which is generally intractable. We find it interesting that near-optimal performance is usually achieved by a simple hierarchical policy which sets prices first, based on a non-nested stochastic model, and then uses these prices to optimize nested capacity allocation. This tractable policy largely outperforms its counterpart based on a deterministic pricing model. Jointly optimizing price and allocation decisions for the high-end segment improves performance, but the largest revenue benefits stem from adjusting prices to account for demand risk.

© 2014 INFORMS

We show that a monopolist's problem of optimal advance selling strategy can be mathematically transformed into a problem of optimal bundling strategy if four conditions hold: i. consumers and the firm agree on the probability of the states occurring, ii. the firm pre-commits to the spot prices to be charged in the advance selling stage, iii. consumers are risk-neutral, and iv. consumers and the firm do not have time preferences or when they do have time preferences, they discount future at the same rate. The result allows both researchers and practitioners to apply the insights from the well-developed vast literature on bundling to advance selling problems. In particular, we show that advance selling is more profitable than spot selling when consumer valuations across the states are independent or negatively dependent or positively dependent up to a point. We furthermore illustrate the effect of advance selling on the spot prices and consumer welfare: When the firm offers advance selling discounts, it sets higher spot prices, so consumers who do not buy in advance are worse off due to the firm offering advance selling discounts. We extend our analysis to the cases of more than two states and competition only in one of the states. We also show how advance selling can be used as an entry deterrence strategy.

© 2014 INFORMS

At times, consumers are motivated to reduce the influence of a product recommendation on their judgments. Based on previous research, it is unclear whether this correction process will increase or decrease consumers’ confidence in their judgments. We find that source credibility moderates the effect of correction on confidence: correction decreases confidence when a product recommendation comes from a high credibility source but increases confidence when the same message comes from a low credibility source. As a result, correction increases the effectiveness of recommendations from low credibility sources on purchase intentions. Notably, this “confidence via correction” effect is further moderated by elaboration, such that the effect is attenuated for high elaboration consumers. Our results have implications for understanding consumers’ reactions to persuasive messages and for both marketing practitioners and consumer protection agencies using correction cues to influence message persuasiveness.

With permission of Elsevier

It is widely known that loss aversion leads individuals to dislike risk, and as has been argued by many researchers, in many instances this creates an incentive for firms to shield consumers and employees against economic risks. Complementing previous research, we show that consumer loss aversion can also have the opposite effect: it can lead a firm to optimally introduce risk into an otherwise deterministic environment. We consider a profit-maximizing monopolist selling to a loss-averse consumer, where (following Koszegi and Rabin (2006)) we assume that the consumer's reference point is her recent rational expectations about the purchase. We establish that for any degree of consumer loss aversion, the monopolist's optimal price distribution consists of low and variable "sale" prices and a high and atomic "regular" price. Realizing that she will buy at the sale prices and hence that she will purchase with positive probability, the consumer chooses to avoid the painful uncertainty in whether she will get the product by buying also at the regular price. This pricing pattern is consistent with several recently documented facts regarding retailer pricing. We show that market power is crucial for this result: when firms compete ex ante for consumers, they choose deterministic prices.

This is an open access article.