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The aim of both marketing theorists and resource-based view proponents is to explain the creation and the sustainability of competitive advantages (Srivastava et al., 2001, p. 777). What has not been considered so far is the role of exploitation positions within the competitive game. The purpose of this article is to investigate the consequences of a strategy concerning the active creation of exploitation positions on the side of the customers. The reason for this is the observed tendency in several industries - elevators, paper machines, gas turbines - to actively create such positions. The underlying assumption is that this strategy leads to a competitive advantage for the initial transaction as well as to higher profits for the supplier taking into account the entire relationship. Mainly the second advantage of a higher profit depends heavily on the sustainability of an exploitation position. Therefore, this paper identifies the drivers controlling the sustainability of an exploitation position. In order to derive a broad understanding three different theoretical approaches - Transaction Cost Economics, the Resource-Based View, and Market Process Theory (Austrian Economics) - will be used to explain the effects of exploitation on the competitive position and the profit of the supplier. Finally, the outcome of this paper is threefold: First, the competitive consequences of an exploitation strategy will be identified. Second, the impact of each theoretical approach on the question of exploitation will be analyzed. Third, the integrative potential of the three different theoretical approaches will be examined. More precisely, we discuss institutional economics and information asymmetry in a truly dynamic setting and the impact of radical ignorance and alertness on the idea of isolating mechanisms. This will be done in a parallel discussion of the problems in general and along one case study which focuses on the elevator market.

With permission of Emerald

We explore the interaction between fairness attitudes and reference dependence both theoretically and experimentally. Our theory of fairness behavior under reference-dependent preferences in the context of ultimatum games, defines fairness in the utility domain and not in the domain of dollar payments. We test our model predictions using a within-subject design with ultimatum and dictator games involving gains and losses of varying amounts. Proposers indicated their offer in gain- and (neatly comparable) loss- games; responders indicated minimum acceptable gain and maximum acceptable loss. We find a significant “generosity effect” in the loss domain: on average, proposers bear the largest share of losses as if anticipating responders’ call for a smaller share. In contrast, reference dependence hardly affects the outcome of dictator games -where responders have no veto right- though we detect a small but significant “compassion effect”, whereby dictators are on average somewhat more generous sharing losses than sharing gains.