Publication records

In distributive negotiations, people often feel that they have to choose between maximizing their economic outcomes (claiming more value) or improving their relational outcomes (having a satisfied opponent). The present research proposes a conversational strategy that can help negotiators achieve both. Specifically, we show that using an offer framing strategy that shifts offer recipients' attention to their reservation price (e.g., “How does my offer compare to your minimum price?”) leads to both (a) an assimilation effect whereby recipients make more favorable counteroffers (economic benefit) as well as (b) a contrast effect whereby recipients feel more satisfied with the negotiation (relational benefit). We find evidence for the effectiveness of this conversational strategy across four experiments (N = 1522) involving different negotiation contexts (real estate, restaurant sale) and participant samples (MBAs, sales agents, online participants), and also document negotiator power as an important boundary condition. Overall, our research suggests that economic and relational benefits do not have to be mutually exclusive in distributive negotiations, that the perceived extremity of an offer is subjective and can be strategically influenced, and that assimilation and contrast effects can operate simultaneously when they relate to separate outcomes.

With permission of Elsevier

Luxury is as old as humankind and has sparked multiple debates throughout of history. In today’s consumer society, luxury brands have become aspirational symbols. Yet, to date, a comprehensive overview of the different perspectives that have shaped the discourses about luxury is missing. Hannes Gurzki provides a broad overview of luxury research, highlights and details important perspectives on luxury, and derives practical guidelines for managers based on research. Thereby the author combines insights from different disciplines, such as philosophy, sociology, psychology, anthropology, cultural studies, economics or management, to broaden and deepen our understanding of luxury and its creation principles.

Copyright Information: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2020

New regulations and opportunities in the decentralized energy market can be good for the planet and business.

Increasing dependence on information technology calls for strengthening the requirements on their safety and security. Vulnerabilities that result from flaws in hardware and software are a core problem which market mechanisms have failed to eliminate. A strategy for resolving this issue should consider the following options: (1) private- and public-sector
funding for open and secure production, (2) strengthening the sovereign control over the production of critical IT components within an
economic zone, and (3) improving and enforcing regulation. This paper
analyses the strengths and weaknesses of these options and proposes
a globally distributed, secure supply chain based on open and mathematically proved components. The approach supports the integration
of legacy and new proprietary components.

We offer theory and evidence about how the fit between firm experience (supply side) and consumer preferences (demand side) affects postentry performance into a new technology. Specifically, we explore different types of preentry experience (technological and market experience) and use different aspects of postentry performance to draw inferences about consumer heterogeneity. Preentry technological experience (same product and different consumers) helps firms attract a larger share of intensive users (aligning with early adopters) but only if they enter the market early when these adopters make decisions. Preentry market experience (different product and same consumers) helps firms attract a larger share of lighter users, consistent with characterizations of mass market users. Exploiting different components of firm performance in the global second-generation mobile telecommunications industry (average usage intensity and market penetration) allows us to articulate and identify the paths and mechanisms that allow preentry experience to affect postentry performance. The theory as well as important theoretical boundary conditions have implications for research on preentry experience, demand-side heterogeneity, and industry evolution.

© 2019, INFORMS

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and, in particular, XOR Arbiter PUFs have gained much research interest as an authentication mechanism for embedded systems. One of the biggest problems of (strong) PUFs is their vulnerability to so called machine learning attacks. In this paper we take a closer look at one aspect of machine learning attacks that has not yet gained the needed attention: the generation of the sub-challenges in XOR Arbiter PUFs fed to the individual Arbiter PUFs. Specifically, we look at one of the most popular ways to generate sub-challenges based on a combination of permutations and XORs as it has been described for the "Lightweight Secure PUF". Previous research suggested that using such a sub-challenge generation increases the machine learning resistance significantly.
Our contribution in the field of sub-challenge generation is three-fold: First, drastically improving attack results by Rührmair et al., we describe a novel attack that can break the Lightweight Secure PUF in time roughly equivalent to an XOR Arbiter PUF without transformation of the challenge input. Second, we give a mathematical model that gives insight into the weakness of the Lightweight Secure PUF and provides a way to study generation of sub-challenges in general. Third, we propose a new, efficient, and cost-effective way for sub-challenge generation that mitigates the attack strategy we used and outperforms the Lightweight Secure PUF in both machine learning resistance and resource overhead.

We study a canonical model of simultaneous price competition between firms that sell a homogeneous good to consumers who are characterized by the number of prices they are exogenously aware of. Our setting subsumes many employed in the literature over the last several decades. We show there is a unique equilibrium if and only if there exist some consumers who are aware of exactly two prices. The equilibrium we derive is in symmetric mixed strategies. Furthermore, when there are no consumers aware of exactly two prices, we show there is an uncountable-infinity of asymmetric equilibria in addition to the symmetric equilibrium. Our results show the paradigm generically produces a unique equilibrium. We also show that the commonly-sought symmetric equilibrium (which also nests the textbookBertrand pure strategy equilibrium as a special case) is robust to perturbations in consumer behaviour, while the asymmetric equilibria are not.