Publication records

This case study provides an overview of the retail financial service industry in Germany at the end of 2003 and how MLP AG, an innovative financial services firm, has developed a unique position in the market through customer focus. Rich data especially on the demographic trends that are shaping the industry are given. Additional data on key players of the industry are supplied. This data will enable the students to develop a good understanding of the structure and drivers of this industry. A focus is on the rather innovative MLP business model and strategy and the firm's underlying business activities that have created a uniquely differentiated positioning. The case study is intended for MBA marketing programs. It can also be used as part of a competitive strategy program to discuss the issues related to sustainable competitive advantage.

This case study provides an overview of the retail financial service industry in Germany at the end of 2003 and how MLP AG, an innovative financial services firm, has developed a unique position in the market through customer focus. Rich data especially on the demographic trends that are shaping the industry are given. Additional data on key players of the industry are supplied. This data will enable the students to develop a good understanding of the structure and drivers of this industry. A focus is on the rather innovative MLP business model and strategy and the firm's underlying business activities that have created a uniquely differentiated positioning. The case study is intended for MBA marketing programs. It can also be used as part of a competitive strategy program to discuss the issues related to sustainable competitive advantage.

This is the first of a five-case series (306-138-1 to 306-142-1). In 1991, a small task force of government officials in Peru began laying the groundwork for the sale of a controlling 35% stake in the country's telecommunications duopoly: Compania Peruana de Telefonos (CPT) and Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL). The telecom privatization was part of a larger program launched by President Alberto Fujimori, which aimed to turn Peru's many state-owned enterprises over to the private sector by the end of the decade. Although the telecommunications industry was not the first to be privatized under the Fujimori initiative, it would be by far the biggest to date. Eight international telecommunications consortia qualified to take part in the bidding process. The winning consortium would face the challenge of being the major economic player in the country, would obtain high visibility and would have to form a partnership with the government in order to continue the economic reforms. Case (A) provides background on Peru's economy and the telecom industry, describes its privatization program, including the privatization plan developed for the telecommunications industry, and the key players in the process, including regulatory agency OSIPTEL, government committee CEPRI-Telecom, and the three consortia bidders Telefonica (Spain), Southwestern Bell (USA) and GTE (USA).

Case (B) provides background on the three consortia of bidders in Peru's telecom privatization, including business group data for each of the three.

Case (C) describes the day of the bid (28 February 1994), on which each of the three bidders submitted their offers for a 35% controlling stake in both CPT and ENTEL. Telefonica Group's winning bid of US$2,002 million was more than double the other two bids, to the surprise of all players involved.

Case (D) looks at Telefonica del Peru's financial performance, and the appreciation of Spanish Telefonica's investment. By late 2003, Telefonica Group of Spain had significantly outperformed its competing bidders (Verizon and SBC) for seven consecutive years. Its performance was due to its strong domestic operations but more to its successful international growth strategy, focused on Latin America.

Case (E) describes Telefonica's position in 2004, as the largest telecom operator in the Spanish and Portugese-speaking world, and provides supporting data. A background note 'The Global Telecommunications Industry (2002)' (306-143-5) is available to accompany this case series.

In late March 1999, French car company Renault announced that it had bought a 36.6 percent stake in Japanese Nissan for US$5.4 billion to form an alliance between the two companies. With no experience of running a global operation, and still recovering from a failed attempt to merge with Volvo in 1995, Renault seemed an unlikely candidate to take on Nissan, which with US$20 billion of debt, was verging on bankruptcy. The press and industry analysts were nearly unanimous in their disapproval of the alliance, which one observer referred to as 'a marriage of desperation for both parties.' By March 2004, Renault's investment was worth US$18.4 billion, and was regarded as a successful model by competitors, practitioners and business schools. How did Renault and Nissan achieve this remarkable turnaround? Through a unique approach, beginning with a six-month social initiation phase, which established common ground and concrete opportunities for collaboration between the two companies. Carlos Ghosn (a Renault executive who became Chief Operations Officer of Nissan in 1999, and later Chief Executive Officer) was central to this process, through his introduction of the Nissan Revival Plan. This was a company-wide business initiative with clear targets, which aimed to radically strengthen the company's 'common glue' around the mission of revival. In parallel, the social amalgamation between Renault and Nissan continued through cross-company teams, and nurtured collaboration. In this way, the companies created an environment of genuine trust, loyalty and reciprocity, which in turn enabled them to develop the integration mechanisms needed to forge a top performing global partnership in less than five years.